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Abstract
In this paper, we offer a novel explanation to the surge in patent-
ing observed during the last few years. When PTOs (Patent and
Trademark Offices) award bad patents, not only do “false innovators”
have the incentive to file applications but also, and more interestingly,
“true innovators” are forced to patent more intensively in an attempt
to signal their type. However, if they are liquidity constrained, true
innovators may fail to separate and this fact reduces the incentives
to exert effort in R&D. In addition, drawing on the signaling role of
patents highlighted by the model, we investigate some of the propos-
als that have been put forward in order to mitigate the bad patents
problem. We provide an intuitive condition under which a tightening
of the patentability standards (“raising the bar”) reduces the distor-
tions caused by bad patents. Moreover, we show that introducing a
two-tiered patent system is unlikely to improve market outcomes.
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1 Introduction
During the last few years, a dramatic increase in patenting has been ac-
companied by a rise in the number of so-called “bad patents”. As a mat-
ter of fact, PTOs (Patent and Trademark Offices) are increasingly granting
patent protection to innovations that do not meet the novelty and/or the
non-obviousness requirement, and that would not get through a careful ex-
amination of the patentability standards.1
Since the seminal paper by Farrell and Shapiro (2008), the literature has
investigated the economic consequences of bad patents.2 According to several
commentators, the vast majority of bad patents covers useless technologies or
products that no one will ever use and, as such, is economically irrelevant.3
As a consequence, PTO examiners should not pay more attention to every
application being filed but they should rather concentrate on the few patents
that may represent a too heavy burden to future innovators. This argument
is clearly summarized by the following quote taken from Lemley et al. (2005,
page 12): “The problem, then, is not that the Patent Office issues a large
number of bad patents. Rather, it is that the Patent Office issues a small but
worrisome number of economically significant bad patents...”. However, this
view overlooks an important role that patents play. When some significant
characteristic of the inventor is not observable, then patents might serve as
a quality signal for third parties, such as potential investors or competitors
(see Long, 2002 and Schankerman, 2013).
Several empirical studies demonstrate the growing importance of patents
as signaling devices, especially for start-ups and, more generally, for SMEs.
These companies have little or no track record, and therefore face more se-
rious informational problems. For instance, Hsu and Ziedonis (2008) look
at US semiconductor firms that received venture financing and show that
1The issue is particulary serious for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Lemley and
Sampat (2008) report that between 75% and 97% of patent applications filed in the U.S. is
finally approved and, rather provocatively, they ask themselves whether the USPTO has
become a rubber-stamp that grants patents to every application being filed.
2The role of licensing negotiations in mitigating the consequences of bad patents is
investigated in Farrell and Shapiro (2008) and in Choi (2005). Caillaud and Duchene
(2011), on the other hand, focus on the overload problem at the PTO and demonstrate
the possible emergence of a “low R&D equilibrium”. In such an equilibrium, firms invest
little in R&D, they file many applications some of which based on bogus ideas, and the
(overloaded) PTO grants bad patents with large probability.
3Lemley et al. (2005) report a series of curious patents awarded by the USPTO, such
as patents “covering obvious inventions like a crustless peanut butter and jelly sandwich,
ridiculous ideas like a method of exercising a cat with a laser pointer, and impossible
concepts like travelling faster than the speed of light.”
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having a large stock of patent applications increases both the likelihood of
the company being financed by venture capitalists as well as the amount of
financial aid received. By using their estimates, Gambardella (2013) calcu-
lates that the value of patents as quality signals could be as high as US $ 1.2
million, though he suggests that 93 thousand is a more reasonable estimate.
Similarly, the recent Berkeley Patent Survey shows that the top-ranked mo-
tivations to patent for technological start-ups are the increased chances of
securing outside investment and the enhancement of the company’s reputa-
tion, both suggesting that patenting occurs for signalling purposes (see Gra-
ham et al., 2010). Additional empirical evidence in favor of the signaling role
of patents is provided by Mann (2005), Cockburn and MacGarview (2009),
Häussler et al. (2009), Conti et al. (2013a), and by Greenberg (2013).4
Clearly, when the PTO issues a significant number of bad patents, the
credibility of the information conveyed through the patenting process can be
seriously undermined. When “true innovators” as well as “false innovators”
get through the examination process at the PTO, patents become a noisy
signal about the quality of the inventor/innovation.5
A couple of recent theoretical papers investigate the signaling role of
patents when the screening of the PTO is of poor quality. Koenen and
Peitz (2013) model an infinite horizon game in which, at each period of
time, the firm generates a patentable idea. The two authors determine the
conditions under which reputational concerns induce the firm to only apply
for a patent when it has generated a true innovation (and therefore refrain
from filing bad applications based on bogus ideas). Atal and Bar (2014) focus
on one of the proposals for mitigating the bad patents problem suggested in
the literature, namely the introduction of a two-tiered patent system where
inventors are free to apply for a “gold-plated” patent (with higher fees and
tighter PTO scrutiny but also offering stronger protection for the invention)
or for a “regular” patent. Although, the authors show that introducing
a second patent-tier reduces the incidence of bad patents, they also prove
4Conti et al. (2013b) on the other hand look at two signals firms may use (patents
and capital invested by the entrepreneur in the venture) and show that venture capitalists
care more about patents, while business angels are more concerned with the money the
founder has invested.
5The examination process at PTOs can be very long and one may wonder whether their
decisions actually convey valuable information to third parties. As a matter of fact, PTOs
reveal important information on applications before taking the final approval/rejection
decision. For instance, within 18 months of the application being filed, the European
Patent Office (EPO) publishes the search report where the references that call the novelty
or the inventive step of a claim into question (the so-called X and Y references) are listed;
applications with many X and Y references are likely to be ultimately rejected. Greater
details on the examination process at the EPO can be found in Harhoff and Wagner (2009).
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that economically more significant innovations do not necessarily end up in
applications for gold-plated patents.
In this paper, we focus on a different mechanism true innovators might
use in order to signal their type, namely the number of applications they
file.6 As a matter of fact, firms are often involved in various R&D projects
and, therefore, they may file several patent applications. Moreover, there is
no one-to-one correspondence between innovations and patents and a single
new product or process may be covered by a series of patents, some of them
applied possibly for some ancillary/secondary aspects of the innovation.7
In the following sections, we consider a start-up company with limited
financial resources involved in a multi-stage innovation game in which patents
just have a signaling role (they are used to signal whether the firm is a “true”
or a “false” innovator). In the first stage, the firm observes the financial
resources needed to complete the research project and chooses whether to
make the investment. Should it choose to invest, the innovation is developed
and the firm becomes a “true innovator”; if it does not, the innovation does
not materialize and we say that the firm becomes a “false innovator”. In the
second stage, the firm decides how many patent applications to file. However,
since the PTO does not screen applications perfectly, the false innovator also
has an incentive to file applications. The maximum number of patents the
firm can apply for is determined by the financial resources remaining after
the investment decision. Hence, the assumption of limited financial resources
implies that, even though a true innovator benefits most from signaling,
the false innovator is endowed with a greater budget for patenting, as it
did not invest during the previous stage. We show that as a result of the
imperfections in the PTO examination process, true innovators increase the
number of applications filed in an attempt to signal their type. However,
if they are liquidity constrained at the patenting stage they are unable to
separate from the false innovator; hence, they collect lower revenues. In turn,
as we show in the Extensions section, the inability of the true innovators to
signal their type reduces R&D incentives.
Our paper contributes to the recent literature addressing the growing
concerns for the increasing numbers of patents that allegedly fail to meet
6The number of applications as a signal of quality is also considered by Conti et al.
(2013a). However, they do not consider the issue of bad patents, and they assume that
when deciding how many patents to apply for the innovator is never liquidity constrained,
which is one of the key drivers of our analysis.
7In a study on the pharmaceutical industry, Ouellette (2010) reports that, on average,
3.5 patents cover one single drug increasing to about 5 in the case of blockbuster drugs. For
the use of patents covering ancillary aspects of the innovation, see Hemphill and Sampat
(2012).
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the novelty or non-obviousness requirement and offers a new explanation to
the recent surge in patenting. While the literature suggests that, especially
in high-tech sectors, companies amass large patent portfolios in order to use
them strategically during negotiations or even to preempt competitors,8 we
argue that the observed rise in patenting can also be explained by poor PTO
screening coupled with the signaling role of patents.9 In our model, the rise in
patenting is not simply due to the rather obvious fact that the false innovator
takes advantage of low PTO standards to file numerous applications. More
interestingly, the increase may result from the fact that true innovators are
induced to rise the number of applications in an attempt to signal their type.
As argued above, the signaling motive for patenting seems to be partic-
ularly important for start-ups and SMEs. Similarly, the assumption of a
limited budget available for patenting and research, is more suited to char-
acterize the behaviour of start-up companies and small enterprises. For in-
stance, the existence of a trade-off between resources spent on patenting and
investment in R&D activities was shown by Mann (2005) in a study on the
software industry. The author reported an interview with a software devel-
oper who explicitly acknowledged that “Every dollar we spend on [patenting]
is a dollar we can’t spend on a software engineer (pp. 982-3)”. A trade-off
between patenting and R&D is also suggested by the size of spending on the
patent application process. According to Graham et al. (2010) the estimated
cost of obtaining a patent in the U.S., including attorney fees, is $35,000. As
regards the E.U., in a study prepared for the European Patent Office, Roland
Berger (2005) estimates that the overall cost of filing an application is be-
tween 30,000 and 46,000 euros. These figures clearly show that the cost of
patenting may be substantial, especially for start-ups or SMEs. Indeed, the
technological start-ups included in the Berkeley Patent Survey reported that
the main reason they choose not to apply for patent protection was the cost
of the application process. The second most important reason was the cost of
enforcing patents (see Graham et al., 2010). Similarly, in a study on patent-
ing behavior in the UK, Hall et al. (2013) observed that the low propensity
to patent of SMEs is most likely explained by the high costs related to both
the application process as well as the monitoring, enforcement and, possibly,
litigation of the IP rights.
A series of recent theoretical papers focuses on the informational content
revealed by the decision of whether to patent or keep the innovation secret
8See Hall and Ziedonis (2001) among others.
9This fact is also suggested implicitly in Long (2002) . When patents stocks convey
information, then there are incentives “to patent the smallest publishable unit, and divide
what would normally be a single patent on an invention into multiple smaller patents on
different facets of the same invention.”
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and/or by the decision of how much innovation-related information to disclose
(Anton and Yao, 2003 and 2004, Jansen, 2011 and Fabrizi et al, 2013). This
literature does not focus on the bad patents issue which, instead, is our main
concern.10 More concretely, our paper differs from these contributions in
two fundamental ways. Firstly, the PTO is not explicitly modelled in this
literature: all patent applications are accepted and, consequently, signaling
only occurs through the strategies chosen by the firm. In Anton and Yao
(2003) and Jansen (2011) patents can be invalidated ex-post by the Court;
but, such a decision does not convey any information about the firm’s type.
By contrast, in our paper, we assume that information is revealed both by
the strategy chosen by the firm as well as by the PTO’s decisions. The
Patent and Trademark Office is more likely to accept applications filed by
the true innovator and, hence, its acceptance/rejection decisions reveal useful
information about the firm’s type. The importance of the PTO’s decisions
for signaling purposes is supported by the above evidence according to which
granted patents increase the chances of being backed by VCs. The second
major difference of our model rests on the assumption of limited financial
resources that might constrain the choices of the firm. These two assumptions
enable us to develop a model in which bad patents emerge as an equilibrium
phenomenon and true innovators patent intensively in an attempt to signal
their type.
Interestingly, our paper is consistent with a puzzling result that emerges
in the empirical literature looking at the signaling role of patents. While
the stock of patent applications appears to significantly improve the chances
of being financed, findings regarding granted patents are contrasting: in
some studies they do not add anything (e.g. Haüssler et al, 2009) while
in others they further increase the likelihood of receiving financial aid (e.g.
Greenberg, 2013). This mixed evidence cannot be reconciled with theoretical
contributions mentioned above. However, it is consistent with the main result
of our model in which in some cases the true innovator is able to separate
through the number of applications it files, while in others it is prevented
from separating by the financial constraint. As a result, the decision of the
PTO is redundant in the former cases but it is informative in the latter ones.
In the paper, we also discuss some of the proposals that have been put
forward in order to mitigate the bad patents problem. We provide an intuitive
condition under which an improvement in the screening ability of the PTO,
coupled with an increase in the patenting fees (“raising the bar”), is likely
10In Anton and Yao (2003) and (2004) and in Jansen (2011) only true innovators were
considered. Fabrizi et al. (2013) analysed the case of a firm possessing either a “good
idea” or a “bad idea”, with the latter requiring greater costs in order to be patented.
However, the authors show that in equilibrium only good ideas are patented.
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to reduce the distortions caused by the presence of bad patents. Moreover,
we show that a two-tiered patent system is likely to be ineffective once we
depart from the standard assumption that the firm chooses either zero or
one patent. When the firm also chooses the number of patents to apply for,
it is able to endogenously “gold-plate” its innovation. Hence, introducing a
two-tiered patent system is unlikely to increase market efficiency.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in Section
2, while in Section 3 we derive the equilibrium of the game and the main
results. The policy implications of our findings are discussed in Section 4,
and in Section 5 there are some extensions and a discussion of the main
assumptions of the model. Finally, Section 6 concludes. All proofs can be
found in the Appendix which also contains some microfoundations of the
reduced form of payoff we consider in the paper.
2 The Model
A start-up company endowed with an idea for an R&D project and with fi-
nancial resources K, is involved in the following three-stage innovation game.
In the first stage, the firm observes the investment i necessary to complete
the R&D project. Should the investment be undertaken, the innovation is
developed and the firm “becomes a true innovator”; if the investment is not
undertaken, the innovation does not materialize and the firm “becomes a
false innovator”. During the second stage of the game, the firm chooses how
many patent applications, n ≥ 0, to file at the Patent and Trademark Office.
As we clarify below, the PTO’s screening of the patentability requirements
is not perfect and this may also encourage the false innovator to file patent
applications. In the last stage of the game, payoffs are realized. More specif-
ically, the three stages of the game are as follows.
t=1: investment stage
The firm privately observes the amount of investment required to complete
the project: i ∈ {I1, I2, I3} , with I1 < I2 < K < I3. Clearly, when i = I3
is observed, the firm does not have enough financial resources to proceed.
Hence it terminates the project becoming a false innovator. By contrast, we
assume that I1 and I2 are small enough and such that the R&D project is not
only viable but also profitable. Hence when i = I1 or i = I2 the investment
is undertaken. We assume that the innovation technology is deterministic:
whenever the investment is undertaken the innovation realizes and we say
that the firm becomes a true innovator. The probabilities of the different
realizations of i are p1, p2 and p3, respectively, with p1 + p2 + p3 = 1; these
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probabilities are publicly known.
t=2: patenting stage
In the second stage, the firm chooses the number of applications, n ≥ 0,
to file at the Patent and Trademark Office. For the sake of simplicity, in
what follows we consider n as a continuous variable.11 Moreover, we assume
that patents are only a device to signal the firm’s own type (true or false
innovator) to the market, and we abstract from any other motivation, such
as protective reasons, that may induce the firm to patent.
The PTO does not have the time or resources to conduct an accurate
screening of applications, and its examination of the patentability require-
ments is not perfect. As a result of this, the PTO may grant patents also to
the false innovator.
We assume that the firm is free to file any number of applications, with
the only constraint represented by the financial resources remaining after the
investment stage. Formally, if we let P denote the patenting fees, the firm
can apply at most for n ≤ (K−I)/P ≡ n̄(I), where I is the amount invested
at t = 1, with I = i if the firm has made the investment and I = 0 in the
case it did not invest.
We assume that each application by the true innovator is accepted by
the PTO, and, by contrast, the applications by the false type may be either
accepted or rejected. Hence, the number of patents granted by the PTO
equals n if the applicant is a true innovator while it may be smaller for
the false innovator. Clearly, when the PTO grants less than n patents, its
decision is fully informative: it “certifies” that the firm is a false innovator.
On the contrary, when n patents are granted, then the PTO’s decision is not
fully informative and the applicant may either be a true or a false innovator.
Formally, we let g(θ, n) ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that the PTO’s
decision is fully informative; in other words, when the false innovator files
n applications, g(θ, n) is the probability that the PTO grants less than n
patents. The parameter θ measures the accuracy of the PTO’s decision.
We assume that g(θ, n) is differentiable in its two arguments and such
that:
Assumption 1 : i) ∂g(θ,n)
∂θ
> 0, ii) ∂g(θ,n)
∂n




Assumption 1-i) implies that the more accurate the PTO’s screening pro-
cess (the larger θ) the higher the probability that some of the false innovator’s
11For expositional convenience, we refer to n as the “number” of patent applications,
even though, with a continuous variable, it would be more appropriate to talk about the
“mass” of applications.
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applications are rejected. Similarly, assumption 1-ii) requires that the likeli-
hood of the PTO’s decision being fully informative increases with the number
of applications. As n rises, the applicant reveals more information during the
patenting process making it easier for the PTO to figure out whether the in-
novation has been developed.12 Finally, assumption 1-iii) implies that there
is weak complementarity between the number of applications and the PTO
accuracy.
Clearly, when the firm does not file any application (n = 0) the PTO
takes no decision, and no information is revealed, g(θ, 0) = 0.
t=3: payoff stage
We model the last stage of the game in a reduced-form manner13 where we
assume that the payoff depends on: i) whether the firm is a true or a false
innovator, and ii) the market’s beliefs about the firm type. The beliefs are
based on the number of applications filed by the firm and on the PTO’s
decision. Consequently, as argued previously, in our model patenting only
has a signaling role.
Formally, let ξ (1−ξ) denote the belief associated with the event “the firm
is a true innovator” (“the firm is a false innovator” respectively). Clearly,
when n applications are filed, ξ = 0 if the PTO grants fewer than n patents
while we let ξ = ξn if n patents are awarded. More concretely, the payoffs
are as follows:
• with probability f(ξ) the firm earns a large profit: the false innovator
earns R, the true innovator earns Rl, with l ≥ 1;
• with probability 1− f(ξ) the firm earns a small profit: the false inno-
vator earns r, the true innovator earns rl, with 0 ≤ r < R.
Therefore, when the market holds the belief ξ, the payoff that the false
and the true innovator expect at stage t = 3 is:14
f(ξ)R + (1− f(ξ))r = f(ξ)∆ + r, (1)
f(ξ)Rl + (1− f(ξ))rl = f(ξ)∆l + rl,
respectively and where ∆ ≡ R− r.
12Assumption 1-ii) is in line with the literature on information disclosure at the patenting
stage. For instance, Anton and Yao (2004) assume that the broader the patent protection
applied for (the larger n in our setting) the more information the firm is required to
disclose.
13In the Appendix, we provide three possible microfoundations for the reduced-form
payoff we employ
14Expected payoffs are computed net of K, i and nP .
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By resorting to one of the microfoundations provided in the Appendix,
we can interpret the above payoff structure in the following manner. At t = 3
the firm needs to be financed by a venture capitalist in order to bring the
innovation to market. The probability of being financed is f(ξ), and depends
on the beliefs that the venture capitalist holds. The payoff the firm collects
depends on its type and on the probability of being financed.
Throughout the paper we assume that f(ξ) is differentiable and increasing
in ξ. Using the previous interpretation of the model, this means that the
venture capitalist is more likely to finance the firm as the probability that it
attaches to the event “the firm is a true innovator” increases. Notice that
for any beliefs, the payoff of the true innovator is l times larger than that of
the false type. This assumption, combined with the behavior of the PTO,
implies that we are postulating a positive correlation between the chances of
being granted patents and the payoffs that the two types of the firm are able
to collect.15
We look for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the game and we
require the out-of-equilibrium beliefs to be “reasonable”; in particular, we
require them to satisfy the D1 criterion.16
3 Equilibrium at the patenting stage
At the patenting stage, two things matter: i) whether the firm has developed
the innovation (i.e. whether it is a true or a false innovator) and ii) the
amount of financial resources that it can use to file patent applications. From
the investment stage, it follows that the firm can actually be of three different
types.17 If it did not complete the project it is a false innovator that can
apply for at most n̄(0) = K/P patents. If instead it developed the innovation
it can be of two different types according to the amount of resources invested
at t = 1. The firm can be a true innovator that has spent I2 and that
15We believe it is reasonable to assume that the true innovator who has completed the
project resulting in an innovation obtains a higher profit than the false type. Moreover,
our assumption resembles the positive correlation between innovativeness and profitability
commonly postulated in the innovation literature (see O’Donoghue, 1998 and Fabrizi et
al., 2013). Some authors make an even stronger assumption by representing innovativeness
and profitability with the same variable (see O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998).
16See Banks and Sobel (1987).
17The case we focus on (two true innovators and a false type) is the most interesting. If
the investment I2 is not profitable, there are two firm types at the patenting stage: a false
innovator (which has observed either I2 or I3) and a deep-pocket true innovator. It would
be easy to prove that under Assumption 2 the equilibrium of the patenting subgame would
be separating: the false innovator would not apply for any patent while the true innovator
would apply for the minimum number of patents the false innovator is not willing to file.
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therefore can apply for at most n̄(I2) = (K− I2)/P patents; for reasons that
we clarify below, we refer to this type of the firm as the “liquidity-constrained
true innovator”. Alternatively, it can be a true innovator that has spent I1
and that, as a result, can file at most n̄(I1) = (K − I1)/P applications; we
refer to this type of the firm as the “deep-pocket true innovator”. For the
sake of simplicity, when we refer to both the liquidity-constrained and the
deep-pocket true innovators we just say “true types”.
The next lemma proves a very important preliminary result concerning
the patenting game. Suppose, for the time being, that the constraint n ≤
n̄(I), with I = 0, I1, I2, does not apply, and that the firm is able to file
whatever number of patents n it likes. According to Lemma 1, the true types
are the ones that have more incentives to increase the number of applications.
Lemma 1 (Benchmark: no constraint on n) Suppose n is chosen with
some positive probability by the false innovator and by at least one of the true
types; then in any PBE satisfying the D1 criterion, the true types prefer n+ε
to n, where ε is a positive, negligible number.
If there were no financial constraints to the number of applications the
firm can file, then the true types certainly would prefer to increase n in order
to improve market beliefs, and possibly separate from the false innovator.
The reason why this occurs is twofold. The false innovator is less willing to
increase the number of applications: as n rises, the probability of the PTO
certifying the firm to be the false innovator also increases. Moreover, as
shown in (1), the true types benefit more than the false innovator from an
improvement in market beliefs: an increase in ξ implies a benefit proportional
to ∆l for the true types, and proportional to ∆ for the false innovator, with
∆l ≥ ∆.
Let us now consider the behavior of the firm when the financial constraints
n ≤ n̄(I), with I = 0, I1, I2 are in place. In particular, in what follows, we
focus on the most interesting case in which n̄(I1) is so large that the deep-
pocket true innovator can separate, while n̄(I2) is sufficiently low to prevent
the liquidity-constrained true innovator from separating.18
Assumption 2 i) n̄(I1)P > (1−g(θ, n̄(I1)))(f(1)−f(0))∆) and ii) n̄(I2)P <
(1− g(θ, n̄(I2)))(f(1)− f(0))∆).
18It can be proved that if assumption 2-ii) is not satisfied, in the unique equilibrium
the true types separate from the false innovator by applying a sufficiently large number of
patents. By contrast, if condition 2-i) is not satisfied then in the unique equilibrium the
true types apply for the maximum number of patents they can afford, n̄(I2) and n̄(I1),
while the false innovator randomizes between n̄(I2) and n̄(I1) (and possibly n = 0).
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Assumption 2-i) ensures that the deep-pocket true innovator is able to
separate from the false type. More specifically, the assumption implies that
the false innovator does not benefit from mimicking the deep-pocket true
innovator that applies for the maximum affordable number of patents. For-
mally, the condition ensures that the false innovator prefers not to file any
application (n = 0), revealing its type, rather than imitating the deep-pocket
true innovator, and filing n̄(I1) patents. In the former case, the false type
obtains f(0)∆ + r + K. In the latter case, it is detected with probability
g(θ, n̄(I1)) and obtains g(θ, n̄(I1))f(0)∆ + (1− g(θ, n̄(I1)))f(1)∆ + r + K −
n̄(I1)P .
Putting together Lemma 1 (the deep-pocket true innovator prefers to
separate from the false type) and Assumption 2-i) (separation is financially
viable) it follows that:
Lemma 2 In any PBE satisfying the D1 criterion, the deep-pocket true in-
novator separates from the false type.
By contrast, Assumption 2-ii) implies that n̄(I2) is low enough for the
false type to benefit from imitating the liquidity-constrained true innovator,
even if n̄(I2) applications are filed. Formally, Assumption 2-ii) implies that
the false type prefers n̄(I2) (with an associated payoff of g(θ, n̄(I2))f(0)∆ +
(1− g(θ, n̄(I2)))f(1)∆+ r +K− n̄(I2)P ) to n = 0 (with an associated payoff
of f(0)∆ + r + K). An implication of Assumption 2-ii) is the following:
Lemma 3 There is no PBE in which the false innovator separates with prob-
ability 1.
By combining Assumption 2-ii) (the false innovator benefits from imi-
tating the liquidity-constrained true innovator) and Lemma 1 (the liquidity-
constrained true innovator benefits from choosing n + ε when n is chosen
by the false innovator) we are able to derive the optimal strategy chosen by
the liquidity-constrained true innovator in any equilibrium of the patenting
subgame.
Lemma 4 In any PBE satisfying the D1 criterion, the liquidity-constrained
true innovator applies for the maximum affordable number of patents, n̄(I2),
with probability 1.
We are now in the position to determine the unique equilibrium of the
patenting stage that satisfies the D1 criterion.
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Proposition 1 The unique PBE satisfying the D1 criterion is the following:
- the false innovator applies for n̄(I2) patents with probability h(n̄(I2)) ∈
(0, 1] and chooses n = 0 with complementary probability;
- the liquidity-constrained true innovator applies for n̄(I2) patents;
- the deep-pocket true innovator applies for nT > n̄(I2) patents (n
T is
defined in the Appendix).
The beliefs are:
• when the PTO certifies the firm to be the false innovator, ξ = 0;
• when the PTO does not certify the firm to be the false innovator: if
n ≥ nT , then ξn = 1; if n = n̄(I2), then ξn̄(I2) = p2/[p2 + p3(1 −
g(θ, n̄(I2)))h(n̄(I2))]; ξn = 0 in all other cases.
As already shown in Lemma 4, the liquidity-constrained true innovator
applies for the maximum affordable number of patents, n̄(I2), and the false
type imitates it with a positive probability denoted by h(n̄(I2)). Hence,
despite applying for the largest number of patents it can file, the liquidity-
constrained true innovator is unable to separate from the false type. In the
Appendix, we show that when n̄(I2)P is low, then h(n̄(I2)) = 1; in other
words, when the cost of imitating the liquidity-constrained true innovator is
low, the false type mimics it with probability 1. For expositional convenience
in the following we refer to this situation as the low-imitation-cost case. For
larger values of n̄(I2)P, the false type imitates the liquidity-constrained true
innovator with a probability h(n̄(I2)) strictly lower than 1. In other words,
when the cost of imitating the liquidity-constrained true innovator gets larger,
the false type plays mixed strategies. We denote this situation as the high-
imitation-cost case.
When n̄(I2) is observed, market beliefs depend crucially on the PTO
decision. If the Patent Office rejects at least one application, the firm is
known to be the false innovator and ξ = 0; if all applications are accepted, the
market updates its belief according to Bayes’ rule and equilibrium strategies
and ξn̄(I2) = p2/{p2 + p3[(1− g(θ, n̄(I2)))h(n̄(I2))]}.
In contrast to the liquidity-constrained, the deep-pocket true innovator is
able to separate by filing a sufficiently large number of patents nT (> n̄(I2)),
thus making it too costly for the false type to imitate this strategy. In this
case, the decision taken by the PTO is irrelevant since the market, by simply
observing nT , can infer the type of innovator and ξn = 1. As shown in the
Appendix, nT is the number of applications that makes the false innovator
indifferent between choosing nT and playing the equilibrium strategy, n̄(I2).
In summary, Proposition 1 highlights some interesting consequences of
the imperfect screening by the PTO. Firstly, the false innovator gets the
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chance to disguise its type by filing applications. Secondly, the true types
increase the number of patents they file in an attempt to credibly signal that
they have developed the innovation; the liquidity-constrained true innovator
devotes its entire budget to filing applications while the deep-pocket true
innovator raises n up to the point where the false innovator does not profit
from imitating its behavior. Finally, in equilibrium, the PTO decision de-
termines the market beliefs but only in the case of n̄(I2) i.e. only when the
firm is unable to separate through the number of applications. By contrast,
when n is a separating strategy, the PTO decision is irrelevant.
Comparative Statics
The above analysis has shown that “overpatenting” is the optimal reaction to
the low patentability standards applied by the PTO. This finding is reinforced
by the comparative statics analysis we carry out in this section.
We start by determining the effect of an increase in θ on the number of
patents filed by true types.
Corollary 1 In equilibrium the overall number of patents applied for by true
types decreases as θ increases.
The number of applications filed by the liquidity-constrained true inno-
vator does not depend on θ (recall that n̄(I2) = (K − I2)/P ). Hence, the
reduction in applications by true types following an increase in θ is driven
by the behavior of the deep-pocket true innovator. This type of firm applies
for nT patents defined as the number of applications that makes the false
innovator indifferent between the equilibrium strategy, n̄(I2), and n
T itself.
As shown in the Appendix, as θ increases, n̄(I2) becomes comparatively more
profitable for the false innovator than nT . Hence, to restore indifference be-
tween these two strategies nT has to diminish. Indeed, an increase in θ makes
it more likely for the PTO to detect the false innovator, thus reducing its
expected payoff; since ∂2g(θ, n)/∂n∂θ ≥ 0, this (negative) effect is stronger
when nT rather than n̄(I2) is chosen (recall that n
T > n̄(I2)). Moreover,
when n̄(I2) is chosen and the false innovator is not detected, ξn̄(I2) increases,
thus augmenting the payoff for this firm type.
The effect of an increase in θ on the number of applications filed by
the false innovator depends on whether the cost of imitating the liquidity-
constrained true innovator is small or large. In the low-imitation-cost case,
the false innovator applies for n̄(I2) = (K − I2)/P patents, a choice which is
not affected by θ. Therefore, Corollary 1 implies that the overall number of
applications also decreases as θ gets larger.
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On the contrary, in the high-imitation-cost case, θ impacts on the mixed
strategies played by the false innovator due to two opposing effects. On
the one hand, the probability g(θ, n) that the false innovator is detected
increases, thus reducing its payoff from f(ξn̄(I2))∆ + r to f(0)∆ + r; this, in
turn, decreases h(n̄(I2)), the probability that n̄(I2) is selected. On the other
hand, with probability (1 − g(θ, n̄(I2))) the false innovator is not detected







∆; this second effect increases h(n̄(I2)). Therefore,
when condition








is satisfied, the former (negative) effect dominates, and a rise in θ reduces
the expected number of false type applications (h(n̄(I2))n̄(I2)). Therefore,
we can conclude that:
Corollary 2 In the low-imitation-cost case, an increase in θ always leads
to a decrease in the overall number of applications. In the high-imitation-
cost case, condition (2) is sufficient to guarantee that the overall number of
applications decreases as θ gets larger.
4 Policy proposals
Various proposals for fixing the bad patents problem and reducing the num-
ber of applications based on bogus ideas have been put forward by economists,
lawyers and practitioners. Below, we use our model to discuss the possible
effects of some of these proposals.
4.1 Rasing the bar
As advanced by several authors, a possible fix to the bad patents problem is
to “raise the bar”, that is, to make the PTO screening more stringent (see for
example Encaoua et al. 2006). In terms of our model, “raising the bar” can
be interpreted as an increase in θ, the accuracy of the screening activity.19 In
19Kou et al. (2013) and Schuett (2013) also look at the effect of a tightening of
patentability standards. One main difference from our model is that in the setting pro-
posed patents are not used for signaling purposes (innovators always apply for one patent).
Their focus is on how, a strengthening of the PTO examination process affects the incentive
to perform research activities and/or to develop the innovation.
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Corollaries 1 and 2 we have already seen how a rise in θ affects the number of
patent applications. However, the previous findings were derived under the
assumption that the patenting fees P are constant. Clearly, when the PTO is
self-funded, even partially, a rise in θ, by requiring to devote more resources to
screening patent applications, might result in raising patenting fees in order
to offset the increase in costs. To capture this effect, we now assume that the
patenting fees are a (weakly) increasing function of θ: dP/dθ ≥ 0. Hence,
the following analysis is a generalization of the results shown in Corollaries
1 and 2.
The effect of raising the bar crucially depends on how a larger θ affects
g(θ, n̄(I2)). As a matter of fact, in equilibrium, the PTO’s decisions only
affect the beliefs that the market holds when n̄(I2) is observed. In the fol-
lowing, we refer to g(θ, n̄(I2)) as the “probability of correct screening”, i.e.
the probability that the PTO correctly certifies that the firm is the false type.
Notice that when dP/dθ ≥ 0, an increase in θ entails two opposing effects


















The first term/effect is positive since, by Assumption 1, g(θ, n) increases
with θ. On the contrary, the second term/effect is negative: when dP/dθ ≥ 0,
an increase in θ reduces n̄(I2), thus lowering the probability that the PTO
certifies the false innovator (g(θ, n) increases with n).
The effect of a larger θ on the number of applications filed by the true
types is clear-cut:
Proposition 2 Suppose that patenting fees are a weakly increasing function
of the PTO’s accuracy, dP/dθ ≥ 0. In this case, if “probability of correct
screening”, g(θ, n̄(I2)), increases with θ, then the number of patents that true
types apply for decreases as θ rises.
For similar reasons to Corollary 1 the number of applications filed by
the deep-pocket true innovator, nT , falls as θ increases. The effect of tighter
screening by the PTO on the number of applications by the liquidity-constrained
true innovator is clear; as already observed, when dP/dθ ≥ 0, as θ increases
n̄(I2) decreases in order to satisfy the constraint.
Similarly to the comparative static analysis conducted in the previous
section, the effect of a larger θ on the number of applications filed by the
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false type depends on the cost of imitating the strategy of the liquidity-
constrained true innovator. In the low-imitation-cost case, n̄(I2) decreases
and, as a result, the number of false innovator applications falls.
In the high-imitation-cost case, the rise in θ affects the mixed strategies of
the false type. When the probability of correct screening increases with the
scrutiny of the PTO, a rising θ entails the same effects on h(n̄(I2)), as is the
case in Corollary 2. Hence, the same condition guarantees that the expected
number of applications by the false innovator decreases with θ. This leads
us to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose that patenting fees are a weakly increasing function
of the PTO’s accuracy, dP/dθ ≥ 0. In this case, if “the probability of correct
screening”, g(θ, n̄(I2)), increases with θ, then:
i) in the low-imitation-cost case, an increase in θ always leads to a de-
crease in the overall number of applications;
ii) in the high-imitation-cost case, condition (2) is sufficient to guarantee
that the overall number of applications decreases as θ gets larger.
Proposition 3 highlights the conditions under which all three types of
innovator file a smaller number of applications as θ rises. These results are
complemented by the analysis in Section 5.1 below.
4.2 Two-tiered patent system
Another proposal for mitigating the proliferation of bad patents is to intro-
duce a two-tiered system based on two patent types: a “gold-plate” patent
entailing larger patenting fees, stricter scrutiny by the PTO and providing
stronger protection when awarded, and a “regular” patent requiring lower
fees and less scrutiny, but granting weaker rights to the patentee (see Atal
and Bar, 2014).
What we argue below is that a two-tiered patent system is likely to be of
little use once we depart from the standard assumption that the firm can only
choose whether to apply for one or none patents. When the firm can also
select the number of applications to file it can endogenously gold-plate its
innovation by increasing n. Hence having two types of patents is redundant.
Consider the following setting. There are two types of patents: a regular
patent with fees Pr and accuracy θr and a gold-plate patent with fees Pg(>
Pr) and accuracy θg(> θr). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the
firm can only choose one type of patents, i.e. all applications filed by the
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firm must belong to the same tier. Moreover, we suppose that Assumption
2 applies both to gold as well as to regular patents.
Let x be the amount of resources the firm spends in patenting i.e. x = nP ;
with a slight change in notation we let g(θi, x) be the probability of the PTO
detecting the false innovator when the firm spends x > 0 in applying for type
i = r, g patents. Without loss of generality, we assume that:
Assumption 3 g(θg, x) = g(θr, x), for all x > 0.
Assumption 3 implies that if the firm spends the same amount of money
on patenting, the probability of detecting the false innovator is the same
irrespective of whether the firm applies for regular or gold-plate patents. In
other words, the two tiers are “equally efficient” in revealing information on
the firm type.
Proposition 4 compares a single-tier patent system (for instance composed
of regular patents only) and a two-tiered patent system.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium of the patenting game with a two-tiered patent
system is equivalent to that with a single tier.
In the Appendix we show that the equilibrium of the patenting game
that one obtains with a single or with a two-tiered patent system is payoff
equivalent. Hence, adding a second tier does not alter the market outcome
whatsoever.
Proposition 4 is based on the assumption that the two tiers are equally
efficient (Assumption 3). However, the result can be easily generalized; it
would be straightforward to show that if one tier is more efficient than the
other (e.g. the gold-plate patent is more efficient: g(θg, x) > g(θr, x) for any
x > 0), then in equilibrium the firm would never select the less efficient tier
which therefore would play no role at all.
4.3 Penalties/patent bounties
One possible way to reduce the number of bad patents is by fining the appli-
cant should the PTO reject the application. Fines or penalties may take the
form of, for instance, patent bounties (see Thomas, 2001). Clearly, in the
setting we are analyzing penalties would alleviate the bad patents problem.
We are assuming that the PTO does not commit type II errors (applica-
tions filed by the true types are always accepted), hence only applications by
the false type are rejected. Therefore, as the amount of fines increases, the
incentives for the false innovator to file patent applications diminishes.
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The situation changes radically when there is even a small probability
that the PTO commits type II errors (we address this case in Section 5.2).
In this case penalties are also imposed on the true types, and this may reduce
the ability of the liquidity-constrained true innovator to signal its type. If
the PTO imposes penalties in addition to patenting fees P , then the budget
for patenting shrinks thus reducing the informativeness of the signal sent
through the PTO. Substituting patenting fees P with penalties (i.e. having
a PTO that only finances itself through the fees it collects when rejecting
patent applications) may not work either. Besides distorting the behavior of
the PTO which would become more prone to rejecting applications, it might
substantially reduce the number of patents filed by liquidity-constrained true
innovators. When choosing how many patent applications to file firms need
to consider the “worst case scenario” in which many of their applications are
rejected. Hence, in order to be able to cope with (potentially) very large
penalties, firms may need to reduce the number of applications they file
substantially, thus decreasing, once again, the informativeness of the signal
sent by the PTO.
5 Extensions
In this section, we analyze the robustness of our findings to some extensions
to the basic model developed above. In order to simplify the exposition, we
restrict our attention to the low-imitation-cost case in which the false type
chooses n̄(I2) with probability one.
5.1 R&D incentives
In the previous sections, we assumed that the true types are able to collect
profits l-times larger than those of the false innovator. A natural way of
endogenizing l is by assuming that, in addition to the investment decision,
the firm chooses an R&D effort which is only productive if the project is
completed, and is worthless if the firm becomes a false innovator.
Suppose that the firm starts working on an idea for a research project
while there is still uncertainty about its financial viability. Formally, the firm
chooses an effort level e ≥ 0 at time t = 0, before knowing the size of the
investment needed to complete the project, that is, before time t = 1 when
the amount of the investment i ∈ {I1, I2, I3} is observed. Effort is exerted
at cost c(e) ≥ 0, with c′(e) > 0 and c′′(e) ≥ 0. We assume that c(e) is a
non-monetary cost, so that the effort decision does not affect the budget for
the investment and the patenting stages. As anticipated above, effort only
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increases revenues when innovation is actually developed; otherwise it is lost.
Moreover, we assume that: l(e) ≥ 1, with l′(e) > 0 and l′′(e) < 0. Finally,
for the sake of simplicity, the probabilities pi, i = 1, 2, 3, are assumed to be
independent from effort.
When choosing e the firm anticipates that:
• with probability p1 it will observe i = I1 and therefore: it will become
a deep-pocket true innovator that applies for nT patents, separates and
obtains f(1)∆l(e) + rl(e) + K − nT P ≡ π1;
• with probability p2 it will observe i = I2 and therefore: it will become a
liquidity-constrained true innovator that spends its entire budget filing
n̄(I2) applications, that is unable to separate from the false innovator,
and obtains f(ξn̄(I2))∆l(e) + rl(e) ≡ π2;
• with probability p3 it will observe i = I3 and therefore: it will become
a false innovator that applies for n̄(I2) patents and obtains





Hence, the firm chooses e in order to:
max
e
p1π1 + p2π2 + p3π3 − c(e).
By implicitly differentiating the first order condition of the maximization
problem above, it is possible to show that:
Proposition 5 Suppose that at t = 0, before observing the realization of i,
the firm chooses an effort e which only increases the profits of true types. In
the low-imitation-cost case, the effort chosen by the firm increases with θ if
and only if “the probability of correct screening”, g(θ, n̄(I2)), rises with θ.
The effect of raising the bar on the incentives to exert R&D efforts crit-
ically depends on how θ impacts on g(θ, n̄(I2)). When the probability of
correct screening increases with θ, the PTO’s decisions become more in-
formative and this benefits the liquidity-constrained true innovator who is
unable to separate. An increase in g(θ, n̄(I2)) enlarges ξn̄(I2) and therefore π2,
thus providing stronger incentives to exert effort.
It is worth noting two implications of this result. When the patenting
fees are not affected by θ, a tighter PTO scrutiny certainly increases the
precision of the information revealed by the PTO’s decisions, thus enhancing
R&D incentives. The opposite result emerges when the PTO increases fees
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without making the examination process more stringent (i.e. when P is
increased while θ is left unchanged). In this case, the probability of correct
screening falls, since the only effect of the policy change is the reduction
of n̄(I2). As a consequence, an increase in patenting fees without tougher
scrutiny would reduce the effort incentives.
5.2 The PTO’s technology
So far, we have assumed that the PTO only commits type I errors (it grants
patents to the false innovator with positive probability) and “sends” just two
types of signals. As a matter of fact, when rejecting some applications, the
PTO certifies that the firm is the false innovator and consequently sends a
fully informative signal. By contrast, whenever it accepts all the applica-
tions that have been filed, the PTO sends a partially informative signal: the
probability that the firm is a true type is larger than the priors, given that
the PTO has failed to detect the false innovator. The aim of this section is
to prove that the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 is still an equi-
librium even when we assume a more sophisticated PTO’s “technology”. In
particular, we now consider a setting in which the PTO commits both type I
and type II errors (it rejects applications filed by the true types with positive
probability) and sends a richer set of signals than we have considered so far.
As usual, n is the number of applications, while we let m denote the
number of granted patents, and n −m the number of applications that are
rejected by the PTO. Both n and m are continuous variables, with n ≥ 0
and m ∈ [0, n]. While n is chosen by the firm, m, on the other hand, is
determined probabilistically. The probability that the PTO grants m patents
out of n applications depends on whether the applicant is a true or a false
innovator. Formally, we let φT (m/n) and φF (m/n) be the probability density
functions when the applicant is the true or the false type respectively and, in
what follows, we assume them to be beta functions with shape parameters
(1, 1) and (1, 2) respectively. Clearly, φT (m/n) and φF (m/n) are re-scaled
in order for m to take values on the whole [0, n] support. In other words,
φT (m/n) = 1/n, φF (m/n) = 2(n −m)/n2 and the support in both cases is
the segment [0, n].
The density functions we are working with give rise to a sensible system
of beliefs. Suppose that only the false innovator and the liquidity-constrained
true innovator choose n and that they do so with probability 1. The belief
conditional on observing m patents being granted by the PTO (and n −m




np2 + 2p3(n−m) .
As argued above, the set of information that the PTO’s decisions reveal
is much richer than the one we considered in the previous sections. Indeed,
each realization of m ∈ [0, n] gives rise to a different belief. Moreover, ξn(m)
is such that: i) the decision of the PTO is never fully informative as regards
the firm type (any m ∈ [0, n] might realize when the firm is either the true
or the false type); ii) ξn(m) increases in m, so that for a given number
n of applications the larger the number of granted patents the larger the
probability that the firm is a true type; iii) ξn(m) decreases in n, so that for
a given number m of granted patents the higher the number of applications
the lower the probability that the firm is a true innovator.
For the sake of simplicity we assume that p2 = p3 and that f(ξ) = ξ.
Under these assumptions we are able to prove the following result.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the PTO grants m patents out of n applications
and rejects the remaining n−m according to the probability density functions
φT (m/n) = 1/n and φF (m/n) = 2(n −m)/n2. If n̄(I2)P < (1− (ln 3)/2) ∆
and l > (ln 3)/(2 − ln 3), the equilibrium shown in Proposition 1 for the
low-imitation-cost case is still an equilibrium of the patenting stage in this
modified setting.
In this modified setting, the same equilibrium arises as in the low-imitation-
cost case of Proposition 1 provided that n̄(I2)P is low enough and l is suffi-
ciently large. The condition on n̄(I2)P corresponds to the condition discussed
in the comment to the low-imitation-cost case of Proposition 1 and, clearly,
the interpretation is similar. The condition on l implies that profits for the
true types are significantly larger than those for the false innovator. In par-
ticular, it implies that the deep-pocket true innovator prefers to separate by
choosing nT . Note that the condition on l is more restrictive than the equiv-
alent condition in the basic model (l ≥ 1 ). This is due to the fact that, in
the new setting, the false innovator is never “certified” as false, and this in
turn makes mimicking the true type a less risky strategy.
5.3 Equilibrium selection criterion
In the paper, we have employed the D1 criterion to refine the equilibrium at
the patenting stage. As a result, we have been able to select a unique equi-
librium for the signalling game. Given the sensitivity of equilibrium selection
to the choice of the refinements, in this section we discuss what the results
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would have been were we to employ the more standard intuitive criterion
(Cho and Kreps, 1987). In particular, we claim that our results would have
been qualitatively the same. To see this, first of all note that Lemma 3 is
valid for any PBE and does not hinge upon the D1 criterion; hence, the false
type does not separate. Let us now consider the deep-pocket true innovator.
For this firm type, the intuitive criterion plays the same role as in standard
signalling models á la Spence: the deep-pocket true innovator separates by
applying for a number of patents ñT that makes indifferent the false type be-
tween choosing ñT and playing the equilibrium strategy. This result follows
from the fact that the intuitive criterion imposes the belief ξ = 1 if n ≥ ñT is
observed. By contrast, the intuitive criterion is silent when n < ñT is chosen
out-of-the-equilibrium path. Hence, the false innovator and the liquidity-
constrained true innovator choose the same number of applications (Lemma
3 applies), though this is not necessarily equal to n̄(I2). In other words, in
equilibrium, the false innovator and the liquidity-constrained true innovator
pool by choosing npool, with npool ∈ [0, n̄(I2)]. This choice is supported by
the following out-of-equilibrium beliefs: ξ = 0 if n applications are filed, with
n 6= npool and n < ñT .
In summary, if we were to employ the intuitive criterion, the equilibrium
described in Proposition 1 would survive but other equilibria might emerge.
However, all these equilibria share the same distinctive feature: the false
innovator and the liquidity-constrained true innovator apply for the same
number of patents, npool ∈ [0, n̄(I2)], while the deep-pockets true innovator
files the minimum number of applications that the false type is not willing
to apply for. Hence, the only difference that emerges by using the intuitive
criterion instead of D1 is that the equilibrium described in Section 3 is not
unique.
5.4 Patenting for protective reasons
An important function of patents is to protect innovations from imitation.
A possible way of incorporating this further effect in our model is to assume
that the profits for the true types are an increasing function of the number
of patents protecting the innovation; that is, l(n) with l′(n) ≥ 0.20 Clearly,
this assumption raises the patenting incentives for the true innovators and,
for this reason, it would be easy to verify that Lemmas 1 through 4 are still
valid, given that they require the true types to apply for a large number of
20The assumption that only the true innovators benefit from patent protection seems
consistent with our model in which only the true types have actually innovated. A milder
assumption delivering the same results would be that the true types benefit more than the
false innovator from patent protection.
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patents. Hence, the liquidity-constrained true innovator and the false type
would still choose n̄(I2).
Moreover, the behavior of the deep-pocket true innovator would be unaf-
fected unless the protective reasons for patenting were so strong as to induce
this firm type to increase its number of applications above the level that
ensures separation from the false innovator (i.e. applying for a number of
patents above nT ). Clearly, in this latter case, an increase in θ would affect
neither the behavior of the deep-pocket true innovator nor the overall number
of applications.
5.5 Other sources of information
In the paper, we have implicitly assumed that the market only obtains infor-
mation about the firm type through the decisions of the PTO (or through
the strategies played by the different firm types). This assumption, which
focuses on the importance of the PTO’s decisions in revealing information, is
grounded on the empirical evidence showing that, for instance, the size of the
patent portfolio increases the firm’s chances of being financed by a venture
capitalist (see our discussion in the Introduction). However, in some cases,
it is reasonable to assume that the market can obtain information about the
firm type directly from the patent application, e.g. by reading the descrip-
tion and the claims that applications contain a venture capitalist might learn
useful details about the firm.
A possible way of dealing with this additional source of information is
to assume that, in order to infer firm type, the market uses both the infor-
mation revealed by the PTO’s decisions as well as its own ability to read
and understand the applications. For instance, the overall probability of de-
tecting the false type could be given by G(α, θ, n) = g(θ, n) + αn, so that
an increase in the number of applications would improve the chances of the
false innovator being detected either through the “PTO channel” (g(θ, n)),
or by means of the information the market is able to infer on its own (αn).
The information collected through this latter channel might be affected by
the sector in which the firm is operating (e.g. α is large in sectors where the
information contained in the patent applications is particularly revealing)
or, more generally, by the ability of the market to interpret the information
contained in the patent applications.
In such a setting, α and θ play a similar role: an increase in either α,
θ or both enhances the chances of detecting the false innovator. Hence, the
consequences of the additional source of information αn can be figured out
by means of the comparative statics results derived in the paper. From this
observation, it follows that an increase in α reduces the number of patents
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necessary in order to separate from the false innovator, and that for large val-
ues of α a small number of applications might allow true innovators to signal
their type. To sum up, the presence of an additional source of information
obviously reduces the importance of the PTO in revealing information. How-
ever, as argued above, empirical evidence suggests that the PTO’s decision
conveys substantially valuable information for innovators.
6 Conclusions
Our paper offers a novel explanation to the recent surge in patenting; the
argument is based on two key facts. First, empirical evidence shows that
patents play a crucial signaling role and mitigate the asymmetry of infor-
mation between start-up companies and external investors. Second, during
the last few years, PTOs have lowered their standards and, as a result, have
granted an increasing number of bad patents.
In this context, we have shown that firms have great incentives to apply
for patents and they file a higher number of applications than they would
choose to if the PTO had a better screening ability. Poor screening by the
PTOs offers “false innovators” a greater chance of being granted patents,
giving them incentives to file applications. Interestingly, “true innovators”
are consequently induced to patent even more intensively: they do so in
order to separate from false innovators. However, if an innovating firm is
liquidity-constrained it may be unable to apply for a sufficiently large num-
ber of patents to credibly signal its type. In an extension of the model we
have shown that the absence of a credible signal due to poor PTO screening
reduces a firm’s expected revenues and R&D incentives.
An interesting implication of our paper is that the firm type is revealed ei-
ther by the number of applications that are filed or by the number of patents
granted (i.e. by the PTO’s decision), depending on whether the true in-
novator is able to separate or not. This result reconciles some apparently
contradictory findings in the empirical literature. As a matter of fact, while
some studies show that awarded patents do not increase the chances of re-
ceiving financial aid (e.g. Haüssler et al., 2009), others report that the PTO
decision to grant a patent further enhances the likelihood of the company
being financed (e.g. Greenberg, 2013).
In Section 4, we also considered some policy interventions that have been
proposed to reform the patent system and cope with the bad patents issue.
Based on our model, we provide an intuitive condition under which a tighten-
ing of the patentability standards (“raising the bar”), possibly in conjunction
with an increase in the patenting fees, is likely to mitigate the bad patents
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problem. Finally, we show that the proposal to introduce a two-tiered patent
system is unlikely to be effective, once we depart from the standard assump-
tion that firms can apply for either zero or one patent. Indeed, firms can
“gold-plate” their innovations simply by increasing the number of applica-
tions they file, making the second patent tier redundant.
Generally speaking, from a policy perspective, our model suggests that
patent reform proposals should carefully consider the effects of the Patent
Offices screening process on the signaling role played by patents. This is par-
ticularly important for startups and young companies that rely more strongly
on patents as signaling devices.
7 Appendix (1): proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Three cases need to be considered in order to prove Lemma 1. Case i):
n + ε is an equilibrium choice of the true types only. In this case the equi-
librium belief associated with strategies n and n + ε are ξn < 1 and ξn+ε = 1
respectively; therefore, for ε positive but negligible the true innovator cer-
tainly prefers n + ε to n.
Case ii): n+ ε is an equilibrium choice also of the false innovator. In this
case, the false innovator has to be indifferent between n + ε and n. Hence,
the payoff associated with the strategy n+ε (g(θ, n+ε)f(0)∆+(1−g(θ, n+
ε))f(ξn+ε)∆ + r + K − (n + ε)P ) has to be the same as that associated with
strategy n (g(θ, n)f(0)∆ + (1 − g(θ, n))f(ξn)∆ + r + K − nP ); this occurs
when εP = Γ∆, where:
Γ ≡ (1− g(θ, n + ε))[f(ξn+ε)− f(ξn)]− (g(θ, n + ε)− g(θ, n))[f(ξn)− f(0)]
Notice that since ∂g(θ, n)/∂n > 0 and f ′(ξ) > 0, then εP = Γ∆ implies
that ξn+ε > ξn. Next we show that when condition εP = Γ∆ is satisfied,
then the true types strictly prefer strategy n + ε (with associated payoff
f(ξn+ε)∆l + rl + K − (n + ε)P ) to n (with associated payoff f(ξn)∆l + rl +
K − nP ). By comparing the two payoffs it follows that the true types prefer
n + ε to n whenever εP < χ∆l, where χ ≡ f(ξn+ε)− f(ξn).
Notice that ∆l ≥ ∆ (since l ≥ 1) and χ > Γ since g(θ, n + ε)[f(ξn+ε) −
f(0)] > g(θ, n)[f(ξn)−f(0)] which in turn is verified given that ∂g(θ, n)/∂n >
0, f ′(ξ) > 0 and ξn+ε > ξn. Therefore, we have shown that εP < χ∆l when
εP = Γ∆ which implies that when the false innovator is indifferent between
n + ε and n, then the true types strictly prefer n + ε to n.
Case iii): n + ε is an out of equilibrium choice. By using the previous
computations, it follows that the true types prefer n + ε to n provided that
26
the out-of-equilibrium belief ξn+ε is such that εP < χ∆l; in turn, the false
innovator prefers n + ε to n iff εP < Γ∆. Since ∆l ≥ ∆ and χ > Γ as
argued above, then condition εP < Γ∆ implies εP < χ∆l while the reverse
implication does not hold. Therefore, according to the D1 criterion the out
of equilibrium belief associated with n + ε is ξn+ε = 1; in turn, this belief
implies that the true types prefer n + ε to n. ¡
Proof of Lemma 2
Follows directly from Lemma 1 and Assumption 2-i). ¡
Proof of Lemma 3
We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose that the false innovator
separates with probability 1; then it certainly chooses n = 0, thus obtaining
f(0)∆+r+K. In turn, the liquidity-constrained true innovator chooses some
0 < n′ ≤ n̄(I2). By deviating and choosing n′, in a separating equilibrium,
the false type obtains g(θ, n′)f(0)∆+(1− g(θ, n′))f(1)∆+ r +K−n′P. One
can easily check that under assumption 2-ii) the false innovator benefits from
deviating and choosing n′ for any 0 < n′ ≤ n̄(I2). ¡
Proof of Lemma 4
We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose that the liquidity-constrained
true innovator chooses n < n̄(I2) with some positive probability. Two cases
are possible. Case i): also the false innovator chooses n with some posi-
tive probability. In this case, from Lemma 1 we know that the liquidity-
constrained true innovator prefers to deviate and choose n + ε rather than
n; hence, we have a contradiction.
Case ii): n is not chosen by the false innovator, which implies that the
associated belief is ξn = 1. Two subcases are possible: ii-a) the false type
chooses some n′ < n selected also by the liquidity-constrained true innovator
(the deep-pocket true innovator separates, as shown in Lemma 2); or ii-b)
the false innovator chooses n = 0 and separates. Subcase ii-a) is not possible
since, by Lemma 1, the liquidity-constrained true innovator prefers (and
can) deviate by playing n′ + ε. Subcase ii-b) is not possible either: the false
innovator separating with probability 1 violates Lemma 3. ¡
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the false innovator and let nT be the number of applications that
makes this firm type indifferent between n̄(I2) and n
T provided that: i) the
market holds the belief ξnT = 1 when the event “n
T is chosen and the PTO
does not certify the firm to be the false type” occurs, ii) the market holds the
belief ξn̄(I2) = p2/[p2 + p3(1 − g(θ, n̄(I2)))h(n̄(I2))] (see the statement of the
proposition) when the event “n̄(I2) is chosen and the PTO does not certify
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the firm to be the false type” occurs. In other words, nT is the value of n
that satisfies the following equality
g(θ, n̄(I2))f(0)∆ + (1− g(θ, n̄(I2)))f(ξn̄(I2))∆ + r + K − n̄(I2)P =
g(θ, n)f(0)∆ + (1− g(θ, n))f(1)∆ + r + K − nP.
Notice that nT > n̄(I2) otherwise the above equality cannot hold.
Clearly, the false innovator prefers n̄(I2) to any n > n
T and it is indifferent
between n̄(I2) and n
T . Moreover, given the equilibrium beliefs, it prefers
n = 0 to any n ∈ (0, n̄(I2)) and to any n ∈ (n̄(I2), nT ). Hence, the only
possible choices of the false innovator are either n̄(I2) or n = 0; this latter
strategy yields a payoff equal to f(0)∆ + r + K.
Notice that:
a) ξn̄(I2) = p2/[p2 + p3(1 − g(θ, n̄(I2)))h(n̄(I2))] is a decreasing function
of h(n̄(I2)); then, the payoff associated with the strategy n̄(I2) decreases as
h(n̄(I2) increases;
b) under Assumption 1-ii), when h(n̄(I2)) = 0 the payoff associated with
strategy n̄(I2) is larger than the payoff associated with strategy n = 0;
c) when h(n̄(I2)) = 1, then ξn̄(I2) = p2/[p2 + p3(1 − g(θ, n̄(I2)))] and
n̄(I2) is preferred to n = 0 by the false type provided that n̄(I2)P ≤ (1 −
g(θ, n̄(I2)))(f(p2/[p2 + p3(1− g(θ, n̄(I2)))]))− f(0))∆.
Summarizing, the optimal behavior of the false type is:
- when n̄(I2)P ≤ (1−g(θ, n̄(I2)))(f(p2/[p2+p3(1−g(θ, n̄(I2)))]))−f(0))∆,
it chooses n̄(I2) with probability h(n̄(I2)) = 1;
- when n̄(I2)P ∈ ((1 − g(θ, n̄(I2)))(f(p2/[p2 + p3(1 − g(θ, n̄(I2)))]) −
f(0))∆, (1 − g(θ, n̄(I2)))(f(1) − f(0))∆), it chooses n̄(I2) with probability
h(n̄(I2)) ∈ (0, 1) and n = 0 with complementary probability. The probabil-
ity h(n̄(I2)) ∈ (0, 1) is such that the false type is indifferent between n̄(I2)
and n = 0; from a), b) and c) above such h(n̄(I2)) exists.
Consider the deep-pocket true innovator; given the equilibrium beliefs,
it prefers nT to any n > nT . Moreover, by using the same arguments as
those shown in Lemma 1, it would be easy to verify that it prefers nT to any
n < nT with n 6= n̄(I2) since the false does so. Similarly, the deep-pocket true
innovator prefers nT to n̄(I2), given that the false type is indifferent between
the two choices. Finally, the optimal choice of the liquidity-constrained true
innovator is n̄(I2), as shown by Lemma 4.
Consider now the beliefs. Since n = nT is chosen by the deep-pocket
true innovator only, then it follows that ξnT = 1. From the definition of n
T ,
the false innovator never benefits from choosing n > nT , therefore ξn = 1 is
associated with any n > nT . When n = n̄(I2) is chosen and the PTO does
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not certify the firm to be the false innovator, the belief ξn̄(I2) = p2/[p2 +
p3(1 − g(θ, n̄(I2)))h(n̄(I2))] follows from Bayes rule. Consider now an out-
of-equilibrium choice n ∈ (n̄(I2), nT ). Clearly, the liquidity-constrained true
innovator cannot apply for such a large number of patents. The deep-pocket
true innovator prefers n ∈ (n̄(I2), nT ) to the equilibrium strategy nT if and
only if ξn, the out-of-equilibrium belief associated with the event “n is chosen
and the PTO does not certify the firm to be the false innovator”, is such that
f(ξn)∆l + rl + K − nP ≥ f(1)∆l + rl + K − nT P
⇔ (nT − n)P ≥ (f(1)− f(ξn))∆l (4)
In turn, the false type prefers n ∈ (n̄(I2), nT ) to the equilibrium strategy
n̄(I2) whenever ξn is such that (notice that here we exploit the fact that the
false innovator is indifferent between n̄(I2) and n
T )
g(θ, n)f(0)∆+(1−g(θ, n))f(ξn)∆+r+K−nP ≥ g(θ, nT )f(0)∆+(1−g(θ, nT ))f(1)∆+r+K−nT P
⇔ (nT −n)P ≥ (1−g(θ, nT ))[f(1)−f(ξn)]−(g(θ, nT )−g(θ, n))[f(ξn)−f(0)] (5)
A simple comparison between conditions (4) and (5) implies that when-
ever the former one is satisfied also latter holds, while the reverse is not true.
Therefore, the D1 criterion implies that the belief ξn = 0 must be associated
with the out-of-equilibrium choice n ∈ (n̄(I2), nT ).
The same arguments can be used to show that for all the out-of-equilibrium
beliefs such that the liquidity-constrained true innovator prefers n ∈ (0, n̄(I2))
to the equilibrium strategy n̄(I2) also the false innovator does so while the re-
verse is not true. Hence, the D1 criterion implies that the belief ξn = 0 must
be associated with the out-of-equilibrium choice n ∈ (0, n̄(I2)) (notice that
the deep-pocket true innovator obtains a higher payoff from nT than from
n̄(I2)). Finally, the belief ξn=0 = 0 is associated with the choice n = 0 given
that: i) if h(n̄(I2)) ∈ (0, 1) it follows from Bayes’ rule; ii) if h(n̄(I2)) = 1,
condition n̄(I2)P ≤ (1− g(θ, n̄(I2)))(f(p2/[p2 + p3(1− g(θ, n̄(I2)))])− f(0))∆
implies that the choice n = 0 is equilibrium dominated for all three types of
the firm; hence the belief ξn=0 = 0 is consistent with the D1 criterion. ¡
Proof of Corollaries 1 and 2
Particular cases of Propositions 2 and 3 respectively. ¡
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Proof of Proposition 2
We start the proof by focussing on the low-imitation-cost case. Consider
first the behavior of the deep-pocket true innovator. In equilibrium, it applies
for a number of patents nT defined as the value of n that makes the false
type indifferent between choosing n̄(I2) and n; namely
g(θ, n̄(I2))f(0)∆ + (1− g(θ, n̄(I2)))f(ξn̄(I2))∆ + r + K − n̄(I2)P−
[g(θ, n)f(0)∆ + (1− g(θ, n))f(1)∆ + r + K − nP ] = 0.
Denote by (·) the above expression and recall that K−n̄(I2)P = I2. From












































The sum of the first two terms is positive since ∂2g(θ, n)/∂n∂θ ≥ 0
and nT > n̄(I2). The third and fourth terms are also positive given our
assumptions on the functions g(.), f(.) and P (.); finally, the last term is















(f(0)− f(1)) ∆ + P > 0.
Thus it follows that if the probability of correct screening increases with
θ, then dnT /dθ < 0.
Consider now the behavior of the liquidity-constrained true innovator.
Since, dP/dθ ≥ 0 then n̄(I2) is (weakly) decreasing in θ. Hence, the statement
of the proposition follows.
Let us now focus on the high-imitation-cost case. In this scenario, we can
exploit the fact that the false type is indifferent between n̄(I2) and n = 0;
hence, nT can be defined in terms of the value of n that makes the false type
indifferent between n = 0 and n; namely
f(0)∆ + r + K − [g(θ, n)f(0)∆ + (1− g(θ, n))f(1)∆ + r + K − nP ] = 0.
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The rest of the proof is similar to the one we just presented for the low-
cost-imitation case and it is therefore omitted for the sake of brevity.¡
Proof of Proposition 3
From Proposition 2 we know that the true types reduce the number of
applications they file; hence, we just need to focus on the false type. In
low-imitation-cost case, it follows immediately that when dP/dθ ≥ 0 also
the number of patents applied for by the false innovator n̄(I2) is (weakly)
decreasing in θ. Let us focus now on the high-imitation-cost case. In this
scenario, the false type plays mixed strategies and applies for n̄(I2) patents
with probability h(n̄(I2)) and chooses n = 0 with complementary probability.
Again, when dP/dθ ≥ 0, n̄(I2) is (weakly) decreasing in θ; hence we just need
to show that h(n̄(I2)) is decreasing in θ. The probability h(n̄(I2)) is the value
of h such that the strategies n̄(I2) and n = 0 yield the same payoff to the
false type:
g(θ, n̄(I2))f(0)∆+(1−g(θ, n̄(I2)))f(ξn̄(I2))∆+r+K−n̄(I2)P = f(0)∆+r+K
⇔ (1− g(θ, n̄(I2)))(f(ξn̄(I2))− f(0))∆ + I2 −K = 0, (6)
where ξn̄(I2) = p2/[p2 + p3(1− g(θ, n̄(I2)))h], and where we have used the
fact that K − n̄(I2)P = I2.
Calling (·) the expression in (6), from the implicit function theorem it
follows that dh(n̄(I2)/dθ = −(d(·)/dθ)/(d(·)/dh), where
d(·)
dh































When the probability of correct screening is increasing in θ, it follows
that dh(n̄(I2)/dθ ≤ 0 provided that









Hence, the above condition is sufficient to guarantee that the expected
number of applications filed by the false innovator (h(n̄(I2)) in the high-
imitation-cost case decreases as θ gets larger. ¡
Proof of Proposition 4
We prove Proposition 4 by means of three claims. We focus on the case
in which n̄g(I2) ≡ (K − I2)/Pg and n̄r(I2) ≡ (K − I2)/Pr are small enough
so that the false type imitates the liquidity-constrained true innovator with
probability 1 (i.e. we focus on the low-imitation-cost case). A similar rea-
soning applies to the case in which the false type plays mixed strategies
(high-imitation-cost case).
Claim 1: Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 still apply.
Proof. One can easily check that Lemma 1 applies “within the tier”,
that is if ni is chosen with some positive probability by the false innovator
and by at least one of the true types, then the true types prefer to apply for
ni + ε patents rather than for ni, with i = r, g. Lemmas 2 and 3 continue to
hold since Assumption 2 is assumed to be satisfied for both gold-plate and
regular patents.
Claim 2: the liquidity-constrained true innovator applies for either n̄r(I2)
regular patents or for n̄g(I2) gold plate patents and the false type imitates it
with probability 1.
Proof. Lemma 4 applies “within the tier” i.e. it shows that it cannot be
that the liquidity-constrained true innovator applies for ni < n̄i(I2) patents
of type i = r, g. Hence, the liquidity-constrained true innovator applies for
either n̄g(I2) gold-plate patents or for n̄r(I2) regular patents. Notice that the
total expenditure in patenting is the same, n̄g(I2)Pg = n̄r(I2)Pr = K − I2,
hence, by Assumption 3, the two choices generate the same probability that
the false type is detected g(θg, n̄g(I2)Pg) = g(θr, n̄r(I2)Pr). This fact implies
that there are two possible equilibria that are payoff equivalent: the liquidity-
constrained true innovator and the false type apply n̄r(I2) regular patents or
they both apply for n̄g(I2) gold-plate patents. Consider the first equilibrium
for instance; both types choosing n̄r(I2) regular patents is supported by the
following out of equilibrium belief: if n̄g(I2) is observed then, in case the PTO
does not certify the firm to be the false innovator, ξn̄g(I2) = 0 which satisfies
the D1 criterion. As a matter of fact, by definition of n̄g(I2) and n̄r(I2)
the false and the liquidity-constrained types benefit from choosing n̄g(I2)
whenever the associated out-of-equilibrium belief (in the case the PTO does
not certify the firm to be the false type) is ξn̄g(I2) > ξn̄r(I2); hence, the D1
criterion is silent in this case and, therefore, ξ = 0 trivially satisfies it.
Claim 3: the deep-pocket true innovator applies for nTg gold plate patents
or nTr for regular patents with n
T




Proof. Call nTr the number of regular patents that makes the false type
indifferent between the equilibrium strategy n̄r(I2) and imitating the deep-
pocket true innovator by filing nTr patents; formally, n
T
r is the value of nr
such that:
g(θr, n̄r(I2)Pr)f(0)∆ + (1− g(θr, n̄r(I2)Pr))f(ξn̄r(I2))∆ + r + K − n̄r(I2)Pr =
g(θr, nrPr)f(0)∆ + (1− g(θr, nrPr))f(1)∆ + r + K − nrPr.
Similarly, call nTg the number of gold-plate patents that makes the false
type indifferent between the equilibrium strategy n̄r(I2) and imitating the
deep-pocket true innovator by filing nTg patents; formally, n
T
g is the value of
ng such that:
g(θr, n̄r(I2)Pr)f(0)∆ + (1− g(θr, n̄r(I2)Pr))f(ξn̄r(I2))∆ + r + K − n̄r(I2)Pr =
g(θg, ngPg)f(0)∆ + (1− g(θg, ngPg))f(1)∆ + r + K − ngPg.
Since by Assumption 3 g(θg, x) = g(θr, x) for all x > 0, it follows that
nTg Pg = n
T




r are payoff equivalent and the deep-pocket
true innovator is indifferent between the two strategies.
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the low-imitation-cost case and let e∗ be the optimal effort level,
that is the value e that satisfies the first order condition of the maximization
problem stated in the text:





l′(e)− c′(e) = 0,
where ξn̄(I2) = p2/[p2 + p3(1 − g(θ, n̄(I2)))]. Denoting by (·) the expres-






















The above expression is positive provided that the probability of correct











> 0. In turn, the
derivative d(·)/de is negative by the concavity of the profit function. Hence,
it follows that de∗/dθ > 0.¡
Proof of Proposition 6
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dm + r − n̄(I2)P =
(1− (ln 3)/2) ∆ + r − n̄(I2)P.
Given the beliefs specified in Proposition 1 the only sensible deviation for
the false innovator is to choose n = 0 with an associated payoff equal to r. A
simple comparison of the payoffs reveals that choosing n̄(I2) in accordance
with the equilibrium is preferred provided that n̄(I2)P < (1− (ln 3)/2) ∆.
Moreover, nT is the value of n that makes indifferent the false type between
choosing the equilibrium strategy and mimicking the deep-pocket true inno-
vator (with an associated payoff of R−nT P ). A simple computation reveals
that
nT =
(ln 3) (R− r)/2 + n̄(I2)P
P
.

















dm + rl − n̄(I2)P =
(ln 3)∆l/2 + rl − n̄(I2)P. (7)
Given the beliefs specified in Proposition 1 (and given that it is unable
to apply for nT patents by assumption) the best possible deviation is n = 0,
with an associated payoff of rl. The equilibrium strategy n̄(I2) is preferred to
deviating and playing n = 0 provided that n̄(I2)P ≤ (ln 3)∆l/2, a condition
which is verified when n̄(I2)P < (1− (ln 3)/2) ∆.
Consider now the deep-pocket true innovator. By applying for nT patents
as specified in the equilibrium it obtains Rl−nT P = (ln 3) (R−r)/2−n̄(I2)P .
Given the beliefs specified in Proposition 1 the only sensible deviations for
the deep-pocket true innovator is to choose either n = 0 or n̄(I2). The
equilibrium strategy is preferred to n = 0 (associated payoff of rl) provided
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that n̄(I2)P < (l − (ln 3)/2)∆, a condition which is verified when n̄(I2)P <
(1− (ln 3)/2) ∆. By choosing n̄(I2) the deep-pocket true innovator obtains
(7); comparing the payoff associated with the strategies nT and n̄(I2) one
can check that the former is preferred by the deep-pocket true innovator
whenever l > (ln 3)/(2− ln 3).¡
8 Appendix (2): microfoundations
In this section, we present three possible microfoundations of the probabilities
f(ξ) and 1− f(ξ) defined in the model (Section 2).
8.1 Entrant case
Consider the setting described in Section 2 for the first two stages and assume
that by investing i the (incumbent) firm undertakes a process innovation
that reduces its cost. If the firm innovates the (constant) marginal cost is j;
otherwise the marginal cost is j̄, with 0 ≤ j < j̄. The third stage is composed
of two sub-stages as follows:
t = 3.1 : entry decision. There is a potential entrant which decides whether
or not to enter the market. Before taking its decision, the potential
entrant observes the number of patents applied for by the incumbent,
it observes the PTO’s decision and forms its beliefs ξ as specified in
Section 2; moreover, the entrant observes the costs it needs to sink in
order to enter the market, ρχ. The value of χ is common knowledge
while the realization of ρ is private information of the entrant and the
incumbent only knows that ρ is distributed according to a U(0, 1).
t = 3.2 : competition. If the entrant did not enter the market, then: the
incumbent is the monopolist and obtains profits Rl (in the case it has
innovated and operates with the marginal cost j) or R (in the case it has
not innovated and operates with the cost j̄) while the entrant obtains 0.
If instead the entrant entered the market, we assume that the marginal
production cost of the incumbent (j or j̄) becomes common knowledge
and that firms compete. The profits of the incumbent and the entrant
are respectively rl and πE(j) when the incumbent operates with the
marginal cost j and r and πE(j̄) when the incumbent operates with
the marginal cost j̄. We assume that πE(j̄) > πE(j) i.e. the profits
of the entrant are larger when the incumbent operates with the high
marginal cost j̄.
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Consider the entry decision at t = 3.1. The entrant enters the market
provided that:
ξπE(j) + (1− ξ)πE(j̄)− ρχ ≥ 0 iff ρ ≤ ξπE(j) + (1− ξ)πE(j̄)
χ
≡ ρ(ξ).
Notice that, since πE(j̄) > πE(j), then ρ(ξ) decreases with ξ.
Consider now the decisions taken by the incumbent at t = 1 and t = 2.
The incumbent knows that ρ is uniformly distributed over (0, 1). Moreover,
it anticipates that entry occurs with probability ρ(ξ) and that this proba-
bility decreases with ξ (we are implicitly assuming that ρ(ξ) ∈ (0, 1)). The
probability ρ(ξ) corresponds to the probability 1 − f(ξ) in Section 2; hence
we derived a setting where f(ξ) is differentiable and increasing in the beliefs.
8.2 Venture capitalist
Consider an alternative setting consistent with our model. At t = 3, in order
to bring the innovation to market, the firm needs some financial aid from a
venture capitalist (VC). Conditional on being financed by the VC, the true
innovator receives a payoff Rl while the false innovator obtains R, with l ≥ 1.
If not financed, the firm (true or false innovator) obtains 0 (hence, rl = r = 0
according to the notation of the model).
More specifically, we assume that at t = 3 the firm is matched with
a venture capitalist and it makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal s: the VC
obtains a share s ∈ [0, 1] of the profits (the firm obtains the remaining 1− s
share). The cost borne by the VC in order to finance the firm is ρ. The exact
realization of ρ is privately observed by the venture capitalist before deciding
whether or not to accept the proposal of the firm; in turn, the firm knows
that ρ is uniformely distributed over the interval (0, 1).
The VC decides whether or not to accept the proposal after observing the
following information: its type ρ, the number of patents applied for by the
firm, the PTO’s decision, the contract s proposed by the firm. Denoting by
ξ ∈ [0, 1] the belief that it holds when taking its decision, then the venture
capitalist accepts the proposal of the firm provided that:
ξsRl + (1− ξ)sR− ρ ≥ 0 iff ρ ≤ ξsRl + (1− ξ)sR ≡ ρ(ξ, s),
where ρ(ξ, s) is increasing in ξ and in s.
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When offering contract s the firm anticipates that its proposal is going to
be accepted with probability ρ(ξ, s) (we are implicitly assuming that ρ(ξ, s) ∈
(0, 1)).
Consider the firm that makes the proposal s knowing that the VC holds
the belief ξ. The firm anticipates that the proposal is going to be accepted
with probability ρ (ξ, s) and its expected profits are ρ (ξ, s) (1− s) Rl (in the
case of true innovator) and ρ (ξ, s) (1− s) R (in the case of false innovator).
Moreover, observe that at t = 3 we do not need to distinguish between the
liquidity-constrained and the deep-pocket true innovators given that they
have the same strategy set and they expect the same payoff (net of i and of
the patenting fees). Hence, at stage t = 3 there are only two firm types, the
true and the false innovator.
8.2.1 Equilibrium of the sub-game at t = 3
At t = 3, given that the market holds the belief ξ, the true innovator expects
to obtain ρ(ξ, s)(1−s)Rl: it receives the financial aid with probability ρ (ξ, s)
and it obtains a share (1− s) of the expected profits Rl. Similarly the false
innovator expects to obtain ρ(ξ, s)(1 − s)R. Hence the two types choose s
in order to maximize ρ(ξ, s)(1 − s). The following is the equilibrium of the
subgame played at t = 3:
i) the two types of the firm propose sξ = arg maxs ρ (ξ, s) (1− s) and the
VC maintains the belief ξ formed at t = 2;
ii) the VC holds the belief ξ = 0 when receiving a proposal s 6= sξ.
Proof. Given that ρ (ξ, s) increases with the belief ξ and given the
out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the VC, both types of the firm prefer sξ to
any possible deviation. Moreover, notice that the D1 criterion is silent
about the out-of-equilibrium beliefs, and therefore the beliefs specified in
part ii) satisfy it; one can easily check this last point since both types benefit
from proposing s′ 6= sξ if and only if the associated belief ξ′ is such that
ρ (ξ′, s′) (1− s′) > ρ (ξ, sξ) (1− sξ) . Hence the two types of the firm would
deviate under exactly the same circumstances. ¥





where sξ is the equilibrium proposal defined above. Simple calculations show




1− sξ) = (1/4)(ξRl + (1− ξ)R); this latter
function is differentiable and increasing in ξ. Hence we have derived a setting
where f(ξ) is differentiable and increasing in ξ.
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8.3 Licensing
A setting similar to the case of venture capital is the following one. Suppose
that the firm is unable to exploit its innovation commercially and therefore,
at time t = 3, once the previous decisions have been taken, it sells/licenses the
innovation to a licensee. More specifically, we assume the firm is matched
with a licensee, and then it proposes the following royalty contract: the
licensee purchases the innovation and pays the firm a share (1− s) of the
profits generated by the innovation (and keeps the remaining share s). We
assume that licensees differ in terms of the ability to commercially exploit
the innovation: the overall profits generated by the innovation equal ρRl (in
case of true innovator) or ρR (in case of false innovator), with l ≥ 1. The
exact realization of ρ is private information of the licensee while it is publicly
known that ρ is distributed according to a U(0, 1). If the innovation is not
licensed, then the firm obtains no profit (hence, rl = r = 0 in terms of the
notation of the model).
The licensee decides whether or not to accept the royalty contract s after
observing the following information: its type ρ, the number of patents applied
for by the firm, the PTO’s decision, the contract s proposed by the firm.
Denoting by ξ ∈ [0, 1] the belief that it holds when taking its decision, then
the licensee accepts the proposal of the firm provided that:
ξsρRl + (1− ξ)sρR ≥ U iff ρ ≥ U
ξsRl + (1− ξ)sR ≡ ρ(ξ, s),
where ρ(ξ, s) is decreasing in ξ and in s and where U is the reservation
utility of the licensee.
When offering the contract s the firm anticipates that its proposal is going
to be accepted with probability 1 − ρ(ξ, s) (we are implicitly assuming that
ρ(ξ, s) ∈ (0, 1)).
By applying the same arguments used in the case of venture capital, it
would be easy to show that one can derive f(ξ) which is differentiable and
increasing in the beliefs; for the sake of brevity we omit this part.
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